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ABSTRACT
In recent years, smart contracts have suffered major exploits, losing
millions of dollars. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts
cannot be updated once deployed. Though various tools were pro-
posed to detect vulnerable smart contracts, they all fail to protect
contracts that have already been deployed on the blockchain. More-
over, they focus on vulnerabilities, but do not address scams (e.g.,
honeypots). In this work, we introduce ÆGIS, a tool that shields
smart contracts and users on the blockchain from being exploited.
To this end,ÆGIS reverts transactions in real-time based on pat-
tern matching. These patterns encode the detection of malicious
transactions that trigger exploits or scams. New patterns are voted
upon and stored via a smart contract, thus leveraging the benefits
of tamper-resistance and transparency provided by blockchain. By
allowing its protection to be updated, the smart contract acts as a
smart shield.
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• Security and privacy→ Software and application security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of Bitcoin [7], a broad range of blockchain
implementations have emerged. Ethereum [13] is currently the
most popular blockchain technology with respect to smart con-
tracts. Smart contracts are programs that are stored and executed
across blockchain nodes. They are deployed and invoked via trans-
actions. Deployed smart contracts are immutable, but still prone to
bugs. Moreover, since contract owners are anonymous, responsi-
ble disclosure is usually infeasible. Though smart contracts can be
implemented with upgradeability and destroyability in mind, this
is not compulsory. In fact, Ethereum already faced several devas-
tating attacks on vulnerable smart contracts. In 2016, an attacker
exploited a reentrancy bug in a crowdfunding smart contract called
the DAO, draining over $150 million [10]. In 2017, the Parity wallet
was hacked twice due to a logic bug in the access control of the
smart contract, causing a combined loss of over $130 million [8].
In 2018, a blockchain security company called PeckShield reported
that multiple smart contracts have been attacked or are vulnerable
to integer overflows [3]. In 2019, Torres et al. reported an emerging
trend among scammers, that try to lure their victims into traps by
deploying seemingly vulnerable contracts that in reality contain
hidden traps (i.e. honeypots), making users lose their funds if they
attempt to exploit or interact with the smart contract [12].
In response to these events, academia proposed a plethora of
different tools that allow users to scan smart contracts for vulner-
abilities and scams, prior to deploying them on the blockchain or
interacting with them (see e.g. [4, 5, 11, 12]). However, all of these
tools fail to protect inattentive users and contracts that have already
been deployed on the blockchain. In order to protect already de-
ployed contracts, Rodler et al. [9] leverage the principle that every
exploit is performed via a transaction. They propose Sereum, a
modified Ethereum client that detects and reverts transactions that
trigger reentrancy attacks. Unfortunately, Sereum has three major
drawbacks. First, it solely detects reentrancy attacks, despite there
being many other types of vulnerabilities and scams. Second, it
requires the client to be modified whenever a new type of vulnera-
bility or scam is found. Third, not only the tool itself but also any
updates to it must be manually adopted by the majority of nodes
for its security provisions to become effective.
Contributions. Our main contributions are:
CCS ’19, November 11–15, 2019, London, UK C. Ferreira Torres et al.
• We introduce a novel domain specific language (DSL), which
enables the description of vulnerability patterns. These pat-
terns reflect malicious control and data flows that occur
during execution of malicious Ethereum transactions.
• We present a tool calledÆGIS, that reverts1 malicious trans-
actions based on vulnerability patterns, thereby preventing
attacks on vulnerable smart contracts.
• Wepropose the use of a smart contract to store and vote upon
new vulnerability patterns, in order to quickly and safely
propagate security updates, without relying on client-side up-
date mechanisms. This ensures integrity, brings democracy
and provides full transparency on the proposed vulnerability
patterns.
2 BACKGROUND
The Ethereum blockchain is a decentralized public ledger that is
maintained by a network of nodes that distrust one another. Every
node runs one of several existing Ethereum clients, for example
geth2. With the use of these clients, users can send transactions in
order to create and invoke smart contracts. Transactions are broad-
cast through the blockchain network and are processed by miners.
These are a specific type of nodes that propose new blocks and exe-
cute smart contracts via the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The
EVM is a purely stack-based, register-less virtual machine that sup-
ports a Turing-complete instruction set of opcodes. These opcodes
allow smart contracts to perform memory operations and interact
with the blockchain, such as retrieving specific information (e.g.,
the current block number). Ethereum makes use of gas to make
sure that contracts terminate and to prevent denial-of-services at-
tacks. Thus, it assigns a cost to the execution of an opcode. The
execution of a smart contract results in the modification of its state.
The latter is stored on the blockchain and consists of a balance and
a storage. The balance represents the amount of ether (Ethereum’s
cryptocurrency) currently owned by the smart contract. The stor-
age is organized as a key-value store and allows the smart contract
to store values and keep state across executions. In summary, the
EVM is a transaction-based state machine that updates a smart
contract based on transaction input data and the smart contract’s
bytecode.
3 RELATEDWORK
Ethereum smart contracts are programs that are executed across
the Ethereum blockchain. Unfortunately, as with any program, they
may contain bugs and can be vulnerable to exploitation. As dis-
cussed in [1], different types of vulnerabilities exist, often leading
to financial gains for the attacker. The issue is made worse by the
fact that smart contracts are immutable. Once deployed, they can-
not be altered and vulnerabilities cannot be fixed. In addition to
that, automated tools for launching attacks exist [4]. Several de-
fense mechanisms have been proposed (e.g. [5, 11, 12]). However,
while these tools identify vulnerabilities and scams, they cannot
protect already deployed smart contracts from being exploited or
neglectful users from falling for scams. Therefore, to deal with the
issue of vulnerabilities in deployed smart contracts, [9] proposes a
1Consuming gas, without letting the transaction affect the state of the blockchain.
2For more details about the geth client: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum.
Figure 1: An illustrative example of ÆGIS’s workflow: Step
1) A benign user proposes a pattern to the smart contract.
Step 2) Eligible voters vote to either accept or reject the pat-
tern. Step 3) An attacker fails to exploit a vulnerable smart
contract due to the voted pattern matching the malicious
transaction.
modification to the Ethereum client, geth. However, this approach
only deals with one type of attacks, reentrancy, and requires all
the clients in the network to be modified. The latter is an issue
for the following reasons. On one hand side, every update of the
vulnerability detection software requires an update of the differ-
ent Ethereum client implementations. This is true for both, bug
fixes and functionality upgrades, for example the detection of new
vulnerabilities. On the other hand side, every modification of the
clients needs to be adopted by all the nodes participating in the
Ethereum blockchain. This can take time and breaks compatibility
between updated and non-updated clients. In this work, we propose
a generic solution that only requires clients to be modified once
and that protects contracts and users from existing and future vul-
nerabilities, without modifying the clients every time a new scam
or vulnerable smart contract is found.
4 METHODOLOGY
Our idea is to bundle every Ethereum client with a modified EVM
capable of interpreting a DSL. The DSL is specifically tailored to the
EVM instruction set and allows the description of malicious control
and data flows in the form of patterns. The modified EVM can then
revert transactions during execution based on pattern matching.
For example, a malicious integer overflow could be described as the
following pattern:
( opcode = CALLDATALOAD) data−−−→ ( opcode = ADD) ∧ ( stack [ 0 ] +
stack [ 1 ] , stack . r e su l t ) data−−−→ ( opcode i n [SSTORE , CALL ] )
This pattern evaluates to true if a transaction meets all of the follow-
ing three conditions: 1) there is a data flow from a CALLDATALOAD
instruction into an ADD instruction; 2) the result of the addition
pushed by the EVM onto the stack is different from the sum of the
two previous stack elements; and 3) there is a data flow of the result
into either an SSTORE or a CALL instruction.
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Table 1: Ethereum Top 10 Miners by Blocks∗
Miner # Blocks % of all mined blocks
Spark Pool 24,261 24.42%
Ethermine 22,579 23.66%
F2Pool 2 11,373 11.92%
Nanopool 10,579 11.08%
MiningPoolHub 4,422 4.63%
zhizhu.top 3,377 3.54%
0xd224ca. . . b79f53 1,739 1.82%
PandaMiner 1,519 1.59%
0xaa5c42. . . acf05e 1,419 1.49%
xnpool 1,373 1.44%
∗Source: Etherscan.io, August 2019
Patterns are governed via a smart contract that is deployed on-chain
(see Figure 1). Whenever a new vulnerability or scam is discovered,
anyone may write a new pattern using the DSL and propose it
through the smart contract. The contract maintains a list of eligible
voters that vote for either accepting or rejecting a new pattern. If the
majority has voted with “yes”, then the pattern is added to the list
of active patterns. In that case, every client is automatically notified
and retrieves the updated list of patterns from the smart contract
(i.e. the blockchain). Thus, clients are updated independently. The
only requirement is a one-time client-side update of the EVM to
add the capability of processing patterns expressed in the DSL. In
other words, if a pattern is accepted by the voting mechanism, it is
updated instantaneously across all the clients through the existing
consensus mechanism of the Ethereum blockchain.
5 DISCUSSION
Setting up the list of eligible voters is crucial, as these will have
the power to decide on the result of transactions. One option is to
choose miners as eligible voters, as these already carry a powerful
role in deciding which transactions are to be included into blocks.
However, miners may lack incentives to stop specific vulnerabilities
or scams, as well as the expertise to decide on which patterns to be
added or rejected. Moreover, as seen in Table 1, miners should not
be given voting power according to their mining power. Otherwise,
a small fraction of top miners could collude and together control
more than 50% of the votes. Therefore, it may be better to select a
group of independent security experts, such as the members of the
Smart Contract Weakness Classification registry (SWC)3.
In contrast to democratic elections, where privacy and verifiabil-
ity are paramount, a voting system for vulnerabilities would require
accountability. In this light, it is more akin to ‘boardroom’ e-voting
systems than ‘parliamentary’ e-voting systems. Such systems allow
for tracing an unencrypted vote back to a voter, which, in turn,
enables a constituency (e.g., shareholders) to hold the voter account-
able for their voting choices. Another important requirement is
that of fairness: the requirement that each voter should have equal
power to affect the outcome, regardless of when they vote. One
aspect of this is to prevent leaking of intermediate results (which
3For more details see: https://smartcontractsecurity.github.io/SWC-registry/.
would give later voters more information on the effect of their vote).
This can be achieved through the use of cryptographic commit-
ments [2, 6]. Of course, this still lets later voters see the number of
votes cast, which reveals whether or not the result could potentially
be a tie. This violates fairness: the last voter can choose to vote to
create or break a potential tie. To mitigate these concerns, voting
should be done off-chain with a strong protocol. Moreover, this
protocol should result in a a proof of correct execution of the voting
process, which is then stored on-chain to fulfill the accountability
requirement.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposeÆGIS, a modified EVM that uses patterns in order to
protect users from vulnerable smart contracts and scams. Moreover,
we present a novel mechanism that allows patterns to be updated
quickly and transparently via the blockchain. Finally, we discuss
the challenges faced when decentralizing the governance of these
patterns.
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